remark that there are many other interesting possibilities. Most of the logics investigated in recent years result from enriching the power of expression of first order logic in various ways, L,,l, and L(Q) are just two examples. In passing to richer languages the task of constructing models becomes more difficult. By considering fragments of these richer languages specified by preservation theorems it seems possible to regain some of the lost devices for constructing models and yet retain some of the richness of expression. For example, the fragment of L,, which is preserved under ultraproducts is richer than first order logic and yet possesses a compactness theorem. Another intriguing possibility is to develop the theory of "regular" logics. These are the logics specified with respect to first order logic by preservation theorems for relations between structures regular in the sense of Lindstrdm [17], cf. Makkai [19] . Galvin's paper [10] [27] ). Let (p be a universal L-sentence. up is preserved under proper (nonempty) direct products iff p is logically equivalent to a universal Horn sentence. This is probably the second preservation theorem to be found. We remark that if the direct product of the empty system of L-structures were considered in the above theorem then up would be equivalent with a quasi-identity. This modification can be made in most of the theorems below. THEOREM It is not very difficult to elaborate the proof above to the point where a similar proof of Theorem 3' emerges. Care is needed to formulate the appropriate extension of (iii).
DEFINITION. W is a reduced limit of T3 provided W is the direct limit of some system of reduced powers of Q3 directed by a system of embeddings.
This definition is like the definition of ultralimits, the chief difference being that here the canonical embeddings play no special role. Our definition of universal Horn consistency properties differs from the more usual treatment of ordinary consistency properties (see Keisler [16] ) in condition (2) and in the treatment of equations. Condition (2) reflects the fact that disjunctions are permitted only in basic Horn formulas. In usual formulations it is enough to state condition (6) only for the new constants from C and to state condition (7) for the case when ci E C. In connection with condition (7) this is still possible. On the other hand condition (6) turns out to be inadequate, in this weaker form, for the proof of the model existence theorem. This fact is more clearly revealed after the second proof of the joint consistency theorem.
THEOREM 11 (MODEL EXISTENCE). If S is a universal Horn consistency
property and s E S, then s has a model. has published such a syntactical notion and ours will be similar to his. In order to simplify the presentation we are going to suppress all the quantifiers of LUH. This is actually harmless since they are all universal and all our sentences are in prenex normal form anyway. Our syntactical notion of proof will be specified by a set of axioms and rules of inference in the usual way.
PROOF. Let E = {s': s U s' E S}. E is a set of finite character since S is. Let s,, be a maximal member of E, which must exist according to the TeichmiillerTukey lemma. Observe that s C se,. Therefore it is enough to construct a model of se, which is what we will do. Let Te be the set of M-terms in which no
Axioms for universal Horn logic. We use E ( up to denote that there is a proof of (the matrix) of (p from (the set of matrices of) E on the basis of the axioms and rules of inference just given. In order to prove the completeness theorem for our notion of proof it is convenient to prove a version of the deduction theorem. Recall that every universal Horn formula is a (universal closure of a) conjunction of basic Horn formulas. THEOREM It should be reiterated here that both A. Selman and David Kelly obtained similar complete syntactic notions of proof for universal Horn logic. Though our system seems to be somewhat simpler than the one given by Selman in [29] we present it here more as an application of consistency properties and the model existence theorem.
?6. The decision problem for universal Horn sentences preserved under homomorphisms. The last section suggests that function symbols present the only source of any complexity or power of expression that universal Horn logic might possess. In this section we will be concerned with the terms available in L. Since we wish to discuss decision problems in a meaningful setting we will assume that L and all the usual sets associated with it, e.g. the set of all variables, the set of all L-terms, the set of all universal Horn L-formulas, are recursive. The reader interested in a detailed structure for L under these stipulations should consult [28] . In [18] R. Lyndon showed that the set of all L-sentences preserved under homomorphisms is not recursive, assuming L is provided with a relation symbol of rank at least two. We add to Lyndon's result by showing that the set of universal Horn L-sentences preserved under homomorphisms is not recursive, provided L has a function symbol of rank at least two or at least two unary function symbols. Our major tool for establishing this result will be sets of terms satisfying the subterm condition. We refer to [28] 18 is a model of  B (p, 4i). Hence B (p, 4i) is satisfiable and -iB (p, 4i) 4. Develop the theory of logics specified by regular relations as described in ?1 above.
5. Characterize those sentences of L,. preserved (kYos style) under the formation of ultraproducts. Develop the logic specified by that preservation theorem.
